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SEPARATING THE EMPLOYEE FROM THE CITIZEN: 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE IMPLICATIONS OF GARCETTI V. 
CEBALLOS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Christmas Day, 2009, the United States watched in terror and 
relief as Atlantic Northwest Airlines Flight 253 landed safely in 
Detroit, Michigan. 1 Nigerian passenger Abdul Farouk 
Abdulmutallab became the new face of extremist terrorism after his 
failed attempt to detonate the chemical explosive PETN onboard. 2 
While the country remained grateful to Flight 253' s crew and 
passengers for apprehending Abdulmutallab,3 the global public could 
not help but wonder-how did the American government fail to catch 
him earlier? 
President Barack Obama blamed a mixture of human and system 
failures in the federal government's national security agencies.4 No 
federal air marshal was aboard Flight 253. 5 Immediately after this 
incident, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) increased 
security and law enforcement aboard international flights. 6 
1. See Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Plane Passenger Tried to Detonate 
Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at AI. 
2. See id.; see also Kenneth Chang, Explosive on Flight 253 is Among Most Powerfol, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at AI4 ("The complaint identified the explosive as 
pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN."). 
3. See O'Connor & Schmitt, supra note I, at A3. 
4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Security Reviews (Jan. 5, 
20 I 0), http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-security-
reviews. Although the intelligence agencies had prior red flags on Abdulmutallab, 
including a warning from his father, he was never placed on a "no-fly" list. See 
President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Preliminary Information from 
his Ongoing Consultation About the Detroit Incident (Dec. 29, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-preliminary-
information-his-ongoing-consultation-about-detroit- [hereinafter President Barack 
Obama, Detroit Incident]. 
5. See Press Release, Representative Yvette Clarke, Rep. Clarke Releases Statement on 
President Obama's Review of Foiled Terror Plot Aboard Northwest Airline Flight 253 
(Dec. 30, 2009). 
6. See id.; see also Flight 253: Learning Lessons from an Averted Tragedy: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., I lIth Congo (2010) (statement of Jane Holl 
Lute, Deputy Secretary ofthe Department of Homeland Security). 
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Even amidst this confusion, President Obama hailed the employees 
of the national security agencies as "some of the most hardworking, 
most dedicated Americans that I have ever met. In pursuit of our 
security here at home they risk their lives, day in and day out, in this 
country and around the world.,,7 
As one can imagine, the challenges of national security have 
weighed heavily upon public employees. Several have paid a high 
price for fulfilling a moral obligation to blow the whistle8 and reveal 
their government employers' alleged fraud or misuse of public 
funding. 9 In 2006, the DRS fired United States Air Marshal Robert 
MacLean after he successfully exposed the DRS's cost-saving plan to 
avoid paying air marshals' overnight lodging expenses by removing 
them from' non-stop long-distance flights, such as Flight 253 on 
Christmas Day from Amsterdam to Detroit. 10 Although Congress has 
enacted several whistleblower protection statutes, II MacLean and 
other public employees have found little-to-no insulation from 
employer retaliation. 12 President Obama, deemed an advocate for 
whistleblowers,13 pushed Congress to withhold statutory protection 
from public employees in the national security agencies under the 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of2009. 14 
7. See President Barack Obama, Detroit Incident, supra note 4. 
8. For the purposes of this comment, a "whistleblower" is broadly defined as a public 
employee "who [in good faith] reveals classified information because he or she 
considers it their moral obligation to reveal perceived wrongdoing" of his or her 
government employer. Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information: 
Its Proper Role and Scope in a Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433, 
459 (1990). 
9. See Barbara Hollingsworth, Whistleblowers Punished for Warning of Aviation 
Security Lapses, WASH. EXAMINER, (Dec. 29, 2009), http://washingtonexaminer.com 
Inode/134481. 
10. See Joe Davidson, Labor-Management Talks a Firstfor TSA, WASH. POST, July 24, 
2009, at A19; Hollingsworth, supra note 9. 
11. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16. 
12. See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Joe Davidson, Requiem for the Whistleblower Protection Act, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2009, at All; Falloutfrom FBI Investigation Intensifies Callfor Reform at OSC, 15 
FED. HUM. RESOURCES WK. 85 (2008) ("Between 2003 and 2006, the number of 
favorable actions for whistleblowers declined from 150 to 77," and spawned new 
advocacy for WP A reform). 
13. See Joe Davidson, Whistleblowers May Have a Friend in the Oval Office, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 11,2008, at D3. 
14. See S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 
372 Before the Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce, and the D.C. 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, III th Congo 
(2009) (statement of Rajesh De, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, 
U.S. Department of Justice). 
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Interestingly, the First Amendment has historically served as the 
"safety net" to protect public-employee speech, given that Congress 
has never enacted a national, uniform whistleblower protection law. 15 
Balancing the interests both for and against protection, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has repeatedly held that government 
employers may not retaliate against their employees for speech 
regarding matters of public concern unless the speech substantially 
interferes with the government's interest in the efficient 
implementation of policy. 16 
In 2006, the Supreme Court severely restricted this constitutional 
refuge in Garcetti v. Ceballos.17 Holding that the First Amendment 
was a citizen right with very limited application in the public 
employment context,18 Garcetti now precludes whistleblowers from 
judicial recourse and discourages altruistic and valued citizens from 
working productively as public employees. 
This comment will argue that Garcetti's bright-line rule is 
counterproductive to the federal government's interest in efficiency. 
Part II will outline the history of the First Amendment in the public 
employment context. 19 Although once believed to be the central 
watchdog of public-employee speech and its benefit to society, the 
United States Supreme Court in Garcetti stepped aside and deferred 
to the federal legislature to craft limited whistleblower protection. 20 
Part III will discuss the impact of Garcetti on the balance of public-
employee speech interests. Previously, the Court defined protection 
as a balance of the benefits and harm of speech versus that of speech 
suppression. 21 Now, Garcetti ignores the need to protect employee 
speech that benefits the government employer and society. 22 
Part IV will discuss the vitality of citizenship in public employment 
and introduces social science to refute Garcetti's reasoning that a 
citizen's right under the First Amendment should not apply to 
employees. Under the Public Service Motivation (PSM) Theory, 
15. Ceballos Decision Fans Flame for Proposed Whistleblower Legislation, l3 FED. 
HUM. RESOURCES WK., 241 (2006). 
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
18. Id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline." (emphasis added)). 
19. See infra Part II.A. 
20. See infra Part II.B. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part III. 
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public employees are hardworking, unique from their counterparts in 
the private sector, and dedicated citizens. 23 The government furthers 
its efficiency interest by recruiting, hiring, and retaining individuals 
with high levels of these PSM characteristics. 24 
Part V will resolve the discrepancy between Garcetti and the PSM 
Theory by proposing a return to the previous balancing test that 
provided constitutional protection to public-employee speech that 
furthers government efficiency and individual autonomy. 25 
II. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. History and Pickering's Balancing Test 
Defining the constitutional rights of public employees against 
employment retaliation has been in near constant debate since the 
nineteenth century.26 The coexisting, parallel relationships of citizen 
and sovereign versus employee and employer have provided 
challenges in defining when a government employer mayor may not 
discipline an employee for conduct or speech that seems to conflict 
with the goals of the government office. 27 
Historically, a waiver of First Amendment speech protection was a 
condition precedent to government employment. 28 In 1892, First 
Amendment pioneer Oliver Wendell Holmes,29 then an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, concluded 
that a public employee did not merit the same speech protection as an 
ordinary citizen. 30 In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,31 Justice 
Holmes held that a government employee "may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.,,32 Therefore, the public employee holds no constitutional 
protection from employment retaliation on the basis of his speech.33 
23. See infra Part IV.A. 
24. See infra Part IV.A. 
25. See irifra Part V. 
26. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (Equal Protection 
Clause); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (Fifth Amendment); McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) (First Amendment). 
27. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
28. See McAuliffe, 29 N .E. at 517-18. 
29. See generally G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech 
Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REv. 391,397-98 (1992). 
30. See McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517-18. 
31. 29 N.E. 517. 
32. Id.at517. 
33. Randy J. Korzel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1007, 1028-29 (2005) ("Under the [Holmesian] model, government employees retain 
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A public employee "had no right to object to conditions placed upon 
the tenns of employment-including those which restricted the 
exercise of constitutional rights.,,34 
By the mid-twentieth century, the role of the government employee 
had morphed into that of a valued individual and citizen. 35 By then, 
McAuliffe was an extreme view36 and public employees retained 
some constitutional protections in the workplace. 37 In 1968, the 
Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education held that a public 
school teacher was wrongfully fired in retaliation for writing and 
publishing a letter in the local newspaper that criticized his school 
board's use of public funding. 38 
By holding that the public employee's letter was constitutionally 
protected,39 the Pickering Court introduced a new balancing test to 
detennine whether a public employee's speech was entitled to First 
Amendment protection.40 Speaking for the Court, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall explained that the law must weigh "the interests of the 
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern [against] the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it perfonns through its 
employees. ,,41 
The Court concluded that the citizen's interest in speech 
outweighed the government's interest in efficiency given that the 
letter was based on public infonnation, had an attenuated relationship 
with the employee's official duties, and minimally impacted the 
their free speech and free association rights, as do all citizens. But they also must 
accept, as a result of their employment by the government, that the exercise of these 
rights may cause their employers to discipline or fire them."). 
34. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). 
35. See Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. 
MARSHALLL.REv.121, 121 &n.l (1996). 
36. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1996) (citing, among 
others, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), as modem First Amendment 
precedent denouncing McAuliffe'S speech restrictions as conditions of public 
employment). 
37. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("[T]he theory that public 
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.") (quoting the lower 
court's ruling in Keyshian v Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239) (1965)); see also 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674. 
38. 391 U.S. 563,566,574-75 (1968). 
39. ld. at 570, 574-75. 
40. ld. at 568. 
41. ld. 
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professional relationships, morale, and efficiency of his office. 42 This 
factual review suggests that the Court defined the government's 
interest in efficiency as preventing the speech's disruptive impact on 
the individual employee's own performance, the harmony and 
discipline of the office, the regular operation of the office, and, if the 
statements were false, on the public's trust in the organization. 43 
In its rationale, the Supreme Court recognized that society benefits 
from the public employee's participation in the public debate: 
"Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to 
have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the 
operations of the schools should be spent.,,44 
Even though Pickering was a victory for public-employee speech 
protection, the Court continued to permit restrictions on employee 
speech in furtherance of the government's interests in efficiency, 
morale, and discipline of the office. 45 In Connick v. Myers, the Court 
held that employee speech concerning a personal grievance, 
compared to matters of public concern, was more harmful and 
disruptive to office morale and efficiency.46 Where an assistant 
district attorney distributed a survey concerning her office transfer to 
her peers during their lunch break,47 the Court held that, with one 
exception, the survey was not a "matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community," and was precluded from the Pickering 
balancing test and First Amendment protection.48 
The exception noted by the Court involved one question on the 
survey regarding official pressure on employees to support political 
campaigns. 49 The Court held that this question addressed the 
government's unlawful coercion of public employees and therefore 
42. Id. at 569-70. 
43. D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards 
for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 249,252 (1990) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 569-73) (arguing that "[t]he Court implicitly adopted a broad definition of 
disruption in Pickering."). 
44. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. 
45. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983). "To this end [of efficient and 
proper discharge of official duties], the Government, as an employer, must have wide 
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs 
[regarding efficient and proper discharge of official duties)." Id. (quoting Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
46. 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). 
47. Id. at 153 n.13. 
48. Id. at 146-48. Characterizing speech as a matter of public concern is a factual 
determination: "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48. 
49. Id. at 149. 
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constituted a matter of public concern. 50 The Court then applied the 
Pickering balancing test to determine whether this single question 
"'substantially interfere [ d]' with official responsibilities," 
considering the nature of the public employee's speech. 51 The Court 
concluded that the government employer's interest in efficiency 
outweighed the assistant district attorney's interest in speech and 
participation in public debate because the survey interfered with the 
office's close and essential working relationships, and thus the 
effective performance of public responsibilities. 52 Furthermore, 
disrupting speech concerning personal grievances provided 
substantial potential injury to the employer without serious 
countervailing harm in suppression of individual expression. 53 
Like the public concern limitation in Connick, the Court continued 
to refine Pickering throughout the twentieth century. In Waters v. 
Churchill, the Court provided the government employer significant 
deference to define the limits of its employees' speech. 54 Mount 
Healthy v. Doyle confirmed that the employee bears the burden of 
proving unconstitutional retaliation by showing that his speech was a 
substantial factor that caused the government employer's retaliatory 
dismissal. 55 Employer control of employee speech in pursuit of 
office initiatives squares perfectly with the principles that the 
government has broader powers as an employer than as a sovereign, 56 
50. Jd. 
51. Jd. at 150 (quoting the district court below, Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 
(D.C. La. 1981)). Together, the public concern limitation and balancing test are 
known as the Connick-Pickering analysis. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
52. See id. at 151-52. 
53. See id. at 154. "The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require 
that Connick [as his government employer's agent] tolerate action which he 
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority and destroy 
close working relationships." Id. 
54. See 511 U.S. 661, 675, 677 (1994). Cheryl Churchill was fired from her position as a 
nurse at a public hospital in Illinois after others overheard her conversation with 
another coworker and claimed she portrayed the department in a negative light. Id. at 
664-65. The hospital rejected Churchill's side of the story and terminated Churchill 
on the basis of her speech as overheard by fellow employees. Id. at 664. 
55. 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977). A public school teacher submitted an inter-office 
memo to a local radio station and the school board did not renew his employment 
contract. Id. at 282. The Supreme Court held that the school board's action did not 
violate the First Amendment because the teacher failed to establish that his expression 
was a substantial or motivating factor of his employer's adverse action. Id. at 285. 
56. Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 ("[W]e have consistently given greater deference to 
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to 
predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large."). 
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may control its own message (as communicated by its employees), 57 
and that discretion in the government's employment decisions is a 
necessary ingredient of at-will employment. 58 
Still, the Court has closely guarded the speech of public employees 
since Pickering. The Court held in Rankin v. McPherson that judicial 
scrutiny is a central watchdog of a citizen's freedom of expression, 
stating that "[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers 
do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because 
it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree 
with the content of employees' speech.,,59 Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District60 and City of San Diego v. Roe61 
emphasized the judiciary's responsibilities of furthering the First 
Amendment's protection of speech upon matters of public concern 
and of balancing the nature of each expression on a case-by-case 
basis rather than creating a general rule. 62 Further, the Court 
continued to echo Pickering's rationale that the societal value of 
public-employee speech was central to First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 63 
Despite the Court's deference to government employers, Pickering 
reconciled the long-standing debate of how to define a public 
57. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("[W]hen the 
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is 
entitled to say what it wishes."). 
58. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591,591,594 (2008) (holding that the 
"class-of-one" theory under the Equal Protection Clause, established by the Court in 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), is inapplicable in the 
government employment context given the necessary discretion of the at-will 
employment doctrine). 
59. 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
60. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). A public employee does not lose First Amendment protection 
merely because he agrees to communicate privately with his employer rather than 
publicly. ld at415-16. 
61. 543 U.S. 77 (2004). A police officer's discharge after selling a homemade sexually 
explicit video online, in which he identified himself as a police officer, did not violate 
the First Amendment because the speech was not a matter of public concern. ld at 
78,84-85. 
62. See supra notes 52-53. 
'[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements III 
issue and the circumstances under which they are made to see 
whether or not they ... are of a character with the principles of 
the First Amendment ... .' Because of this obligation, we cannot 
'avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the 
facts of the case.' 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,150 (1983) (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 
U.S. 331, 335 (1946) and lacobelIis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964), respectively). 
63. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672-74 (1994). 
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employee's First Amendment protection against retaliation. Where 
the privilege of public employment once required the waiver of First 
Amendment protection, the public employee after Pickering is 
revered as a valued citizen, whose speech may be restricted only 
when it is a disruption to the efficiency of the office. 64 
B. Present State: Garcetti v. Ceballos 
The Supreme Court refined the Pickering-Connick analysis in its 
2006 decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos. 65 In that case, the Court held 
that a public employee is afforded no constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment for speech pursuant to official duties. 66 This 
bright-line rule divided the protected citizen and unprotected 
employee, furthered the lower courts' confusion in determining 
public employees' First Amendment rights,67 and improperly left 
whistleblower protection to the legislature. 68 Above all, the Court 
sought to define a clear threshold rule but arguably lost sight of the 
balancing considerations of Pickering and the government's interest 
in efficiency. 69 
1. The Case 
In 2000, Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Richard 
Ceballos wrote a memorandum regarding an allegedly inaccurate and 
falsified affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a pending 
criminal trial. 70 In reaction to his memorandum and recommendation 
to dismiss the case, Ceballos claimed that his superiors violated the 
First Amendment by subjecting him to a series of retaliatory 
employment actions, including reassignment and denial of a 
promotion. 71 
Six years later, the Supreme Court held that the Connick-Pickering 
analysis and the First Amendment were inapplicable because 
64. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-72 (1968). 
65. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
66. Id. at 421-22. 
67. See generally Sarah F. Suma, Comment, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech 
Rights of Public Employees Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI. KENT L. REv. 369, 
379-86 (2008) (arguing that a bright line rule eliminating First Amendment protection 
for job-duty speech is inconsistent with theories supporting the protection of free 
speech). 
68. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
69. See infra Part III. 
70. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14. 
71. Id. at 414-15. 
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Ceballos spoke as an employee pursuant to his official duties.72 The 
majority reasoned that the public employee "by necessity must accept 
certain limitations on his or her freedom" because employer control is 
necessary for the efficient provision of public services. 73 
According to the majority, Ceballos's memorandum was separate 
and distinct from the speech of public employees previously held as 
constitutionally protected by the Court. 74 First, the protected letter to 
the newspaper in Pickering was "the kind of activity engaged in by 
citizens who do not work for the government," whereas Ceballos's 
memorandum "owe[ d] its existence to . . . professional 
responsibilities,,75 and lacked any "relevant analogue to speech by 
citizens who are not government employees. ,,76 Separating the roles 
of protected citizen and unprotected public employee "does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen.'>77 Second, speech pursuant to job duties represents an 
official communication of the government agency, raising the 
employer's interest in controlling the speaker's message. 78 Third, 
this heightened interest in controlling employee speech mandates that 
government employers, like their counterparts in the private sector, 
have managerial discretion rather than judicial oversight. 79 
In removing judicial oversight of public-employee speech, the 
Court deferred to the legislature. Protection for whistleblowers, who 
report unethical misconduct or governmental inefficiency, would now 
predominately be through "the powerful network of legislative 
enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor 
codes ... .',80 
Finally, Garcetti left open the question of how to define its bright-
line "spe[ ech] pursuant to official duties" test. 81 Majority-opinion 
author Justice Kennedy stated that the facts of Ceballos's 
memorandum provided "no occasion to articulate a comprehensive 
framework for defining the scope of an employee's duties in cases 
where there is room for serious debate." 82 In the future, lower courts 
72. See id. at 424. 
73. Id. at 418-19 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality 
opinion); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
74. Id. at 422. 
75. Id. at 421-23. 
76. Id. at 424. 
77. Id.at421-22. 
78. Id. at 422. 
79. See id. at 418. 
80. Id. at 425. 
81. See id. at 424-25. 
82. Id. at 424. 
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should use a factual, practical inquiry, rather than a review of a 
written job description, to detennine whether the individual spoke as 
an unprotected public employee pursuant to official duties or as a 
citizen, mandating further judicial review under Connick and 
Pickering. 83 
2. The Dissents 
Although all the Justices agreed that speech related to employment 
could lead to the disruption of office work,84 they remained divided 
on the level of control necessary to preserve the government's 
interest in efficiency. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
did not believe that the government employer's control required a 
constitutional line to be drawn at the workplace, given the intrinsic 
ambiguity of defining the roles or "hats" of employee and citizen. 85 
In their separate opinions, Justices Stevens and Souter agreed that 
establishing a categorical difference between a citizen's speech and 
that of an employee was incorrect. 86 Because a government 
employee should retain some citizen speech protection in the 
workplace, Justice Souter argued that the majority's "official duties" 
distinction was absolute, arbitrary, and backed by no adequate 
justification. 87 
Focusing on the much-valued citizenship of public employees, 
Justice Souter characterized whistleblowers like Ceballos as "citizen 
servants. .. whose civic interest rises highest when they speak 
pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones government 
employers most want to attract.,,88 Ceballos's fonner employer, Los 
Angeles County District Attorney's Office, along with Congress, and 
the United States Food and Drug Administration, are government 
employers who advertise a fulfillment of civic duty as a means of 
recruiting potential employees. 89 With the "right to speak on public 
issues he decides to make the subject of his work day,,,90 public 
83. See id. at 424-25. 
84. See id. at 422-23, 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 428 (Souter, J., dissenting), 446 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
85. See id. at 430 (Souter, l, dissenting) (emphasizing that the public employee continues 
to wear a citizen's hat while he speaks on matters of public concern in regards to his 
job duties, as stated in Pickering). 
86. See id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 430 (Souter, l, dissenting). 
88. Id. at 432. 
89. Id. at 432 n.4. 
90. Id. at 431. 
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employees are in the best position to recognize "'what ails the 
agencies for which they work'" under Pickering;91 pursue their civic 
duties when speaking pursuant to official duties; and excel 
professionally as a result of their civic appreciation for their public 
work. 92 These examples demonstrate the inequity of citizen servants, 
who can further government efficiency through their civic-driven 
initiative at work, facing impending punishment for their beneficial 
employee speech.93 
Given the interest in recruiting these citizens, the need for 
managerial discretion in the office, and the societal value of 
whistleblower speech,94 Justice Souter, with Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, concluded that the Pickering balancing test should be 
adjusted. 95 Under this approach, the Court would allow the 
government employer to control the employee's speech pursuant to 
official duties, except where the employee speaks on matters of 
"unusual importance," such as "official dishonesty, deliberately 
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health 
and safety.,,96 
Justice Breyer was the only member of the Court to conclude that 
the Connick-Pickering analysis was still viable and should be applied 
91. Id at 429 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994». 
92. See id. at 432. 
Indeed, the very idea of categorically separating the citizen's 
interest from the employee's interest ignores the fact that the 
ranks of public service include those who share the poet's 'object . 
. . to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation' . . .. There is no 
question that public employees speaking on matters they are 
obliged to address would generally place a high value on a right to 
speak, as any responsible citizen would. 
Id. at 432-33 (citations omitted) (quoting Robert Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, 
COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (R. Poirier & M. Richardson eds., 
1995». 
93. Seeid. at 431-34. 
94. Id. at 430-34. 
'Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that 
public employees are often the members of the community who 
are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their 
public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to 
the pUblic. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the 
community would be deprived of informed opinions on important 
public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public'S interest 
in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to 
disseminate it.' 
Id. at 433 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77,82 (2004) (per curiam». 
95. See id. at 434. 
96. ld. at 435. 
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where the public employee speaks on matters of public concern in the 
course of his professional work. 97 Justice Breyer discounted Justice 
Souter's adjustment, arguing that it would counteractive1y invite 
more judicial scrutiny as another form of inefficiency and office 
disruption. 98 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer joined the other dissenters, 
concluding that the majority's holding, to withhold constitutional 
protection from speech pursuant to official duties, was "too 
absolute. ,,99 
3. The Reactions 
a. Support and criticism 
The Garcetti decision was met with immediate negative public 
reaction,100 as civil rights activists argued that the Court wrongfully 
turned a blind eye to legitimate whistleblowing,101 and critics hailed 
Ceballos as a heroic citizen. 102 
Supporters of the decision emphasized the public employer's need 
for managerial discretion to ensure competence, accountability, and 
97. Id. at 449-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting): 
I conclude that the First Amendment sometimes does authorize 
judicial actions based upon a government employee's speech .... 
But [only where there is an] augmented need for constitutional 
protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference with 
governmental management of the public's affairs. In my view, 
these conditions are met in this case and Pickering balancing is 
consequently appropriate. 
98. Id. at 449. 
99. Id. at 446. 
100. Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free-Speech Protections, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2006, at A16; High Court Trims Whistleblower Rights, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, May 31, 2006, at 1A. 
101. Ceballos' Casualties, CRIME & FEDERALISM, (July 21, 2009), 
http://www.crimeandfederalism.coml2009/07 /ceballos-casualties.html (discussing 
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
Id. 
The biggest fear [sic] civil rights and open-government advocates 
is coming true. In Garcetti v. Ceballos . .. [t]he Supreme Court 
did not consider what would happen. An opinion issued by a 2-1 
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is illustrative of a 
nationwide trend: Police officers who speak out against official 
corruption are losing their jobs; and the courts will do nothing to 
stop it. 
102. See J. Michael McGuinness, Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's Early 
Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 24 TOURO L. REv. 
529, 529 (2008). 
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efficiency. 103 If the Court had ruled in Ceballos's favor, supporters 
believed that protecting employee grievances would inappropriately 
clog the federal courts and intrude upon supervisors' management 
and control decisions. 104 
At the same time, critics argue that Garcetti's bright-line rule 
invites more judicial interference and inefficiency. Although bright-
line rules are "preferable when the decision must be applied by 
numerous actors facing common or frequent situations,,,105 scholars 
label Garcetti as too minimalistic and inconsistent with the case-by-
case nature of the previous public employee First Amendment 
decisions such as Pickering and Connick. 106 
b. Inconsistent applications by lower courts 
Generally, lower courts apply Garcetti as a threshold determination 
prior to the Connick-Pickering analysis, reviewing the speech's 
public concern nature under Connick and balancing the individual 
and government interests under Pickering. 107 Beyond that 
concurrence, the lower courts' applications of Garcetti are 
inconsistent because the Court's "practical inquiry" instruction left 
103. John Gamble, Commentary, Court Made Right Decision for Well-Managed 
Workplaces, FED. TIMES, June 19,2006, at 21: 
ld. 
104. See id. 
[E]ffective control of an organization is possible only when its 
managers can act in the confidence that their reasonable personnel 
decisions made for the good of the organization will be sustained 
without undue interference. The court's decision in Garcetti has 
avoided the potential for massive judicial interference III 
government's ability to hold its employees accountable. 
105. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an 
Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1173, 1192 (2007) 
(citing Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899, 1913 
(2006» (stating that potential benefits of Garcetti's bright-line decision include 
predictability, uniformity, and transparency, and limiting future judicial discretion). 
106. See id. ("[R]ules may be hazardous when . . . the court lacks the necessary 
information to produce a workable rule that will ensure predictability in future 
decisions."); see also supra note 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the case-
by-case approach of Pickering and its progeny). 
107. See, e.g., Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2009); Davis v. 
McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ronna Greff Schneider, 1 
EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 
§ 2:20 (2010» ('''The inquiry whether the employee's speech is constitutionally 
protected involves three considerations. First it must be determined whether the 
employee's speech is pursuant to his or her official duties. If it is, then the speech is 
not protected by the First Amendment."'); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 
646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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open and unclear how to specifically define "pursuant to official 
duties." 108 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia,109 the Tenth,11O and the Eleventh III Circuits have 
interpreted Garcetti to broadly encompass speech related to the 
completion of the employee's work duties and block First 
Amendment protection thereof.ll2 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in 
Andrew v. Clarkl13 and the Seventh Circuit in Chaklos v. Stevens, 114 
interpreted Garcetti to require that the act of speaking was an official 
duty itself, not merely that the speech related in subject matter to an 
employee's job or fulfilled a general duty.ll5 The Fifth Circuit in 
Davis v. McKinney ll6 and the Ninth Circuit in Freitag v. Ayersl17 
defined Garcetti's "speech pursuant to official duties" as through the 
"chain of command,,,118 a theory expressly rejected by the Sixth 
Circuit in Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District. 119 
108. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). "The Court's failure to articulate an 
'official duties' test has caused lower courts to interpret Garcetti in many different, 
and sometimes conflicting, ways." Christine Elzer, Note, The "Official Duties" 
Puzzle: Lower Courts' Struggle with First Amendment Protections for Public 
Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REv. 367, 367 (2007). 
109. Winderv. Erste, 566 F.3d209, 214-16 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
110. Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1328-34 (lOth Cir. 2007). 
Ill. See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2009). 
112. See Winder, 566 F.3d at 215 ("In our cases applying Garcetti, we have consistently 
held that a public employee speaks without First Amendment protection when he 
reports conduct that interferes with his job responsibilities, even if the report is made 
outside his chain of command."); Abdur-Rahmam, 567 F.3d at 1285-86 ("Speech that 
owes its existence to the official duties of public employees is not citizen speech ... 
and the speech is unprotected."); Casey, 473 F.3d at 1330 (referencing Black's Law 
Dictionary to define "pursuant to" in Garcetti as "in accordance with"). 
113. 561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit held that a Baltimore police 
officer's memorandum to his superiors regarding a police unit's recent shooting of a 
suspect was not barred from First Amendment protection without a factual 
demonstration that writing the memorandum was an official duty of the officer. Id. at 
263,267. 
114. 560 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2009). State-employed scientists did not speak pursuant to 
official duties when they submitted a protest letter to the Illinois State Police 
procurement official because the state employers did "not demonstrate that they 
expected [the state employees] to write this letter." Id. at 712. 
115. See Andrew, 561 F.3d at 267; Chaklos, 560 F.3d at 712. 
116. 518 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Speech related to an employee's job duties that is 
directed within the employee's chain of command is not protected."). 
117. 468 F .3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006). 
118. Davis, 518 F.3d at 313 (citing Frietag, 468 F.3d at 545) ("If however a public 
employee takes his job concerns to persons outside the work place in addition to 
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As of 2009, the lower courts' application of Garcetti continues to 
be unpredictable and highly scrutinized. The Eleventh Circuit 
decision Abdur-Rahman v. Walker,120 which applied Garcetti to bar 
protection to speech related to but not required by employment, 121 
epitomizes the frustration of academia and the public, who see the 
protection of viable whistleblowers withering away. 122 In the five 
years after Garcetti, the "practical inquiry" defining official duties 
continues to be unclear, suggesting the need for revision and review 
by both the judiciary and the legislature. 123 
c. Reliance on unresolved legislative whistleblower protection 
The majority's deference to the "powerful network of legislative 
enactments,,124 for public-employee speech protection has also proven 
to be inconclusive. Although grounded in long-held principles of 
federalism and the separation of powers, 125 the Court's reliance on the 
legislatures has yielded frugal results,126 as the current whistleblower 
protections remain limited and sparse,127 and the Whistleblower 
raISIng them up the chain of command at his workplace, then those external 
communications are ordinarily not made as an employee, but as a citizen."). 
119. 499 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2007). "[T]he determinative factor in [Garcetti] was not where 
the person to whom the employee communicated fit within the employer's chain of 
command, but rather whether the employee communicated pursuant to his or her 
official duties." Id. at 545. 
120. 567 F.3d 1278 (lith Cir. 2009). 
121. See id. at 1286. 
122. See, e.g., Court Further Limits Whistleblower Protections Under Civil Rights Law, 20 
CLEAN AIR REP. (Inside Wash. Publisher's ), May 28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
10035171. 
123. See Elzer, supra note 108, at 368 ("The lower courts' efforts to apply Garcetti's 
categorical holding to various fact scenarios have resulted in some puzzling outcomes 
that seem to have raised more questions than Garcetti purported to settle."). 
124. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) ("Exposing governmental inefficiency 
and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance .... The dictates of sound 
judgment are reinforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as 
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to 
expose wrongdoing."). 
125. ld. at 423. 
126. See S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 
372, supra note 14, at 67-69 (statement of Thomas Devine, Legal Director, 
Government Accountability Project) (arguing that the WPA's recourse system for 
retaliation, under which a majority of public employees seek retribution for speech 
retaliation after Garcetti, cannot properly handle the amount of whistle blowing 
disputes). 
127. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of 
its Workers' Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 39-40 (2009) 
("[S]uch protections are incomplete, patchwork, and of decidedly limited utility .... 
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Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) is still in great debate between 
both houses of Congress 128 and the President. 129 
d. Separating the employee from the citizen 
As Professor Paul M. Secunda stated, "Garcetti v. Ceballos does 
nothing less than redefine the whole conception of what role public 
employees should play in ensuring the fair and efficient 
administration of government services.,,13o Where the roles of citizen 
and public employee were once thought to have coexisting 
relationships with the government,131 Garcetti now requires that they 
be separately defmed and mutually exclusive. 132 To the majority in 
Garcetti, public employees are comparable to their counterparts in 
the private sector and can be silenced by their employers without 
First Amendment consideration because employee speech pursuant to 
[L]ower courts' application of Garcetti to reject the plaintiffs' First Amendment 
claims meant the end of the case because no statutory or other claims remained 
available."). 
128. Since Garcetti, WPEA legislation has been introduced in some form by both houses 
of Congress, but no joint resolution has passed. See Jocelyn Patricia Bond, Efficiency 
Considerations and the Use of Taxpayer Resources: An Analysis of Proposed 
Whistleblower Protection Act Revisions, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 107, 117 (2006); see also 
Joe Davison, Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act Reintroduced in Senate, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 20ll, 7:35 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocallpolitics/whistleblower-protection-
enhancement-act-reintroduced-in-senate/20 11104/141 AFdCnLfD _story.htrnl. On 
April 6, 20 11, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 20 11, providing whistleblower protection for employees of 
intelligence agencies for the first time. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Gov't Affairs, Senators Reintroduce Bipartisan Whistleblower 
Protection Bill (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentR 
ecord _id=2c6498al-505 6-8059-766c-43a 7 d77fe22b. 
129. Obama Administration, Legislators at Odds over Whistleblower Protection 
Amendments, 16 FED. HUM. RESOURCES WK. 654 (2009). 
130. Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal 
Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 117, 117 (2008). 
131. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 432 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Frost, supra note 93, at 252) ("[T]he ranks of public service include those who share 
the poet's 'object ... to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation .... "'). 
132. See id. at 421; Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to Ceballos: The Demise of the 
Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CiTY L. REV. 95, 123-25 (2007) 
(arguing that the Garcetti holding "ignores the employee who retains her citizen's 
conscience while at work." and resembles McAuliffe); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 17-18. 
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official duties is not analogous to citizen speech.133 Of particular 
concern is that this distinction compels whistleblowers to avoid 
directly addressing their employers with problems and to seek out the 
media to safely speak as citizens.134 Therefore, speaking as a citizen 
under Garcetti can arguably lead to an increase in public scrutiny of 
government agencies and a decrease in office efficiency. 
III. UNDERSTANDING GARCETTrS IMPACT ON THE 
BALANCING OF PUBLIC -EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
INTERESTS. 
Generally, the protections of the First Amendment have never been 
adopted as absolute. 135 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has instilled 
a "presumptive prohibition on infringement," such that restraints on 
speech have always required appropriate reasons,136 justified by a 
balance of conflicting interests. 137 This balance addresses societal 
interests 138 and recognizes that matters of public concern are "at the 
heart of the First Amendment's protection.,,139 As the Court stated in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti,140 "[t]he inherent worth of 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not 
depend upon the identity of its source." 141 
With these principles in mind, the Pickering balance defined the 
boundaries of the First Amendment's application in the public-
employment context by weighing the harm of the speech on 
government efficiency142 against the harm of suppressing the speech 
on the interests of the individual and society.143 Subsequent cases 
showed that the disruptive impact of speech on office efficiency 
could be outweighed by the harm of suppressing speech on matters of 
public concern, where the consequences of that silence stretched 
133. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19, 421-22. 
134. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Ellis, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Left (0 
Decide "Your Conscience or Your Job," 41 IND. L. REv. 187,200 (2008). 
135. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). 
136. Id. 
137. ld. at 362. 
138. First Nat'l Bank ofBos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("The Constitution often 
protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication."). 
139. ld. 
140. 435 U.S. 765. 
141. ld. at 777. 
142. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) noting the State's interest, , 
"as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees"). 
143. See id. (noting "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters 
of public concern"). 
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farther than the individual to also impair the government employer 
and society. 144 Because public employees provide a clear lens into 
how to further government efficiency, "[ w Jere they not able to 
speak ... the community would be deprived of informed opinions on 
important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's 
interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own 
right to disseminate it.,,145 Pickering and its progeny allowed for the 
balancing of potential harms implicated by public-employee speech, 
as well as the protection of speech that positively enhanced the 
interests of the individual, the government employer, and society. 146 
In a way, Garcetti furthered the Pickering balancing test. 
Generally, employee speech that relates to the job possesses a greater 
tie to the performance of the government office and poses a greater 
risk of harm than other types of speech. 147 This increased concern of 
efficiency led Garcetti to introduce a definitional balance. 148 Rather 
than a rule providing for case-by-case balancing like in Pickering, the 
Court conclusively held in favor of managerial discretion for all 
future pUblic-employee speech cases, and against the consideration of 
the harm of speech suppression. 149 
With managerial discretion in place of case-by-case analysis, 
Garcetti placed the individual employee and the government 
employer on opposite sides of the balancing scale in spite of the prior 
theory that public-employee speech can be beneficial to all involved. 
If the Court defines pUblic-employee speech protection as a victory 
solely for the individual and speech suppression as a per se benefit to 
144. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). 
145. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam). 
146. "[T]he lesson of Pickering (and the object of most constitutional adjudication) is still 
to the point: when constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand for 
winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that serve all ofthe values at stake." Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (Souter, 1., dissenting). 
147. Jd. at 422 (majority opinion) ("Employers have heightened interests in controlling 
speech made by an employee in his or her professional capacity. Official 
communications have official consequences .... "). 
148. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 142-43 (3d ed. 2008) 
(quoting Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First 
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 
942-43 (1968)) (arguing that the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), balanced interests at a definitional level by implicitly weighing the competing 
policy considerations to hold that "knowingly and recklessly false speech was not 
'speech' within the meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment"). 
149. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. 
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the government,150 it will lose sight of the societal value that public-
employee speech provides to both the employee and employer. 
A prime example is the aforementioned whistleblower and former 
air marshal Robert MacLean. In 2003, when MacLean learned that 
the DHS would no longer place air marshals on nonstop long distance 
flights, he gave this information to an MSNBC reporter after his 
safety concerns went ignored by his superiors. 151 In 2005, DRS 
supporters justified the retaliation against MacLean by highlighting 
the harm of his speech, specifically that he leaked sensitive security 
information and increased the likelihood that terrorists would fly on 
these long distance planes with knowledge of less onboard 
security. 152 
There is no doubt that leaking national security information poses 
risks exponentially greater than the criticism of the school board in 
Pickering. 153 However, the harm of the speech should be assessed 
under the Pickering balance, to first recognize the potential interests 
of society and the individual speaker and then determine whether the 
heightened efficiency interests clearly outweigh and permit speech 
suppression. 154 
As the government employer, the DRS should have considered the 
harm of its speech suppression and the benefit of MacLean's speech. 
First, the permitted termination of MacLean's employment removed 
an extremely dedicated employee, who believed that his speech was 
in pursuit of the oath he took as an air marshal. 155 Second, 
MacLean's speech ignited a strong response from Congress to the 
need for more security on long-distance flights. 156 Despite these 
150. See id. at 418-19. 
151. See American Morning (CNN television broadcast Nov. 20, 2006). The order to 
reduce air marshals on long distance flights came just three days after DHS issued a 
warning that more terrorists were planning hijackings. Audrey Hudson, Ex-Air 
Marshal to Sue Over 'SSI' Label, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at A4. 
152. See American Morning, supra note 151; see also Commentary, Lessons for 
Supervisors, FED. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at 20 ("It is horrifying to imagine what 
terrorists could do with the hugely valuable information MacLean exposed."). 
153. See Lessons for Supervisors, supra note 152, at 20; Porter Goss, Editorial, Loose Lips 
Sink Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2006, at A25 (discussing "[t]he battle to protect our 
classified information" and advocating against speech protection for national security 
public employees who speak to the media and place American lives at risk). 
154. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing 
After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1531, 1537-38 (2008) (discussing the current lack 
of consideration for the societal benefit of whistleblower speech). 
155. See Lessons for Supervisors, supra note 152, at 20. 
156. See American Morning, supra note lSI (noting that if terrorists know there is no air 
marshal on long-distance flights, they are "more likely to take those long distance 
flights and to use those flights to perpetrate terrorist attacks. "). 
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assurances of in-air security, Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit 
had no air marshal aboard on December 25, 2009, when passenger 
Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb. 157 This attempted 
terrorist attack, the subsequent promise to increase the number of air 
marshals on such flights, and President Obama's recognition of 
National Security Agency employees as valuable citizens 158 now 
reaffirms the benefit of MacLean's speech to the DHS as the 
government employer and to society as a whole. 
MacLean initially argued that his termination violated the First 
Amendment. 159 However, his case followed Garcetti and the Ninth 
Circuit decided against him under 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7, holding that 
the termination was proper for his wrongful disclosure of sensitive 
security information. 160 Nevertheless, the compelling societal benefit 
stresses the need to consider public-employee speech as an advantage 
to all and weigh First Amendment conflicting interests on a case-by-
case basis. 161 Clearly, the presumption that employee speech can 
benefit only the individual does not account for instances such as 
Flight 253, in which the potential harm of the suppression of the 
speech was carried by all. 162 
The Garcetti definitional balance presumes that employee speech, 
pursuant to official duties and disagreeable to supervisors, is per se 
harmful to the government employer and should justify the use of full 
managerial discretion in retaliation. 163 Stemming from its separation 
of the public employee from the citizen and rationalization that 
speech pursuant to employment duties is an official communication 
without analogue to speech by a citizen, the Garcetti majority 
disregarded any potential countervailing societal benefit that 
protecting public-employee speech would provide to society. 164 
However, as the next section will demonstrate, citizenship is 
integral to public employment, employee speech, and the furtherance 
of the government's interest in efficiency. 165 Therefore, employee 
157. CNN Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Feb. 7,2010). 
158. See President Barack Obama, Detroit Incident, supra note 4. 
159. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Maclean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145 (9th Crr. 
2008) (No. 06-75112). 
160. See Maclean, 543 F.3d at 1150. 
161. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-21 (2006); see also supra notes 150-154 
and accompanying text. 
162. See V1adeck, supra note 154, at 1546 (discussing the societal benefits of national 
security whistleblowing in the war on terrorism). 
163. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. 
164. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-24. 
165. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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speech does not always represent official government 
communications and can further both the individual's interest in 
participating in public debate as well as the government's interest in 
office efficiency. When balancing the harms of speech protection, 
the Court must recognize and preserve the benefit of employee 
speech in the furtherance of societal interests. 
IV. THE CITIZENSHIP IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
A. Social Science's Public Service Motivation Theory 
The study of the American government as an employer has led 
social scientists to review the value of civil society and civic duty in 
America. From historical Greek philosophers such as Aristotle to 
today's social scientists such as Professor Gene A. Brewer, Ph.D. of 
the University of Georgia, the concept of civil society has remained a 
vague yet key and valuable component to a functional and stable 
democratic government. 166 In fact, Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 
the mid-nineteenth century that the success of the "American 
Experiment" as a prosperous community and political institution with 
respected laws and a satisfied people relied upon the civic-
mindedness of ordinary Americans. 167 
In the twentieth century, Tocqueville's observations were followed 
by further studies, revealing that a strong, civil society, separate from 
government and driven by the interpersonal relationships of families 
and voluntary associations, promotes effective democratic 
government by integrally interacting with the state and economic 
sectors. 168 Therefore, strong social norms of trust and civic 
participation have been repeatedly demonstrated as catalysts to both 
economic and democratic stability and prosperity. 
Although the civil society research of de Tocqueville and beyond 
have focused on the success of ordinary citizens in voluntary 
associations, theorists have paralleled this research with a similar 
review of the government-employment context. In 1982, scholar Hal 
G. Rainey first observed the differences in public- and private-sector 
employee motivation, as public-sector managers yielded significantly 
higher scores by responding more positively about "'a desire to 
166. Gene A. Brewer, Building Social Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behavior of Public 
Servants, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 5,5--6 (2003) [hereinafter Building Social 
CapitalJ· 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 6. 
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engage in meaningful public service. ",169 Since then, social scientists 
have expanded upon the distinction between public and private 
sectors' professional motivation, defining the Public Service 
Motivation (PSM) as "an individual's predisposition to respond to 
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and 
organizations." 170 PSM is a "multidimensional concept," having 
three main pillars from which social scientists gauge an individual's 
level of PSM as a means of understanding their willingness to engage 
in prosocial behavior. 171 These are commitments to public interest, 
service to others, and self-sacrifice. 172 
Social scientists have found that individuals with higher levels of 
these PSM characteristics are more likely to pursue employment in 
the public sector, given their greater sense of public interest. 173 A 
greater sense of public interest communicates to a higher PSM level, 
which is positively correlated with several benefits to his or her 
organization, including a higher level of job commitment, greater 
productivity, and higher job satisfaction. 174 These findings suggest 
that those with greater PSM levels in public sector jobs work harder 
and are less likely to leave their jobs. 175 
The PSM Theory has become a major topic of investigation in 
public administration, given its instrumental implications to 
productivity, accountability, and improved management practices. 176 
169. See Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the Federal Civil 
Service: New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 1. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 
413, 414 (1998) (quoting Hal G. Rainey, Reward Preferences Among Public and 
Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic, 16 AMER. REv. PUB. ADMIN. 288 
(1982». 
170. James L. Perry & Lois Recascino Wise, The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 367, 368 (1990). 
171. See David 1. Houston, "Walking the Walk" of Public Service Motivation: Public 
Employees and Charitable Gifts of Time, Blood, and Money, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. 
& THEORY 67, 69 (2006). 
172. Jd. at 68-69 (citing Gene A. Brewer et aI., Individual Conceptions of Public Service 
Motivation, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 254 (2000». Social scientists dispute over whether 
an interest in politics or policy making should be an additional consideration to define 
an individual's PSM level. See id. 
173. Donald R. Moynihan & Sanjay K. Pandey, The Role of Organizations in Fostering 
Public Service Motivation, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 40, 41 (2007). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (citing Brewer et aI., supra note 172; see also Houston, supra note 171, at 67 
(citing Robert D. Behn, The Big Questions of Public Management, 55 PUB. ADMIN. 
REv. 313 (1995» ("[L]earning how to motivate employees [is] one of the 'big' 
questions of public management."). 
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Researchers have concluded that public employees have a greater 
sense of civic duty than other individuals. 177 As public employment 
is readily referred to as a calling rather than merely a job,178 the 
majority of public employees who answer this call exhibit higher 
levels of trust in their government, civic participation, altruism, 
support of equality, tolerance, and humanitarian behavior than other 
citizens. 179 Similar to the link drawn from civic participation and 
social trust to economic and democratic stability in civil society, the 
higher rates of these characteristics in public employees suggest that 
what makes the "American Experiment" prosperous will also make a 
government organization perform efficiently. 
In 1995, Professors Gene A. Brewer, Ph.D. and Sally Coleman 
Selden, Ph.D. found that a majority of federally employed 
whistleblowers exhibited PSM characteristics similar to those 
mentioned above. 18o Professors Brewer and Selden distributed a 
questionnaire to 20,851 executive branch employees of the federal 
government and received 13,432 complete responses. 181 The survey 
revealed that 2,188 responding employees had observed one or more 
illegal or wasteful activities at their federal agencies. 182 Of these 
witnesses, 51.4% stated they had blown the whistle and reported the 
activity. 183 Based on data from the 1992 Merit Principles Survey by 
the United States Merit Systems Protection Board and prior PSM and 
whistleblower research, the survey compared the public employees' 
perceived importance of personal rewards, job security, complaint 
success, job commitment and satisfaction, achievement, 
organizational performance, and their regard for public interest. 184 
The survey revealed that the whistleblowers were among the most 
productive, valued, and committed members of their public 
organizations and had strong consciences and senses of professional 
responsibility. 185 Compared to the survey's inactive observers of 
177. Houston,supranote 171,at70. 
178. Id. at 68 (citing Alex N. Pattakos, The Search for Meaning in Government Service, 64 
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 106 (2004)). 
179. Brewer, supra note 166, at 14 ("[P]ublic servants are more civic minded than other 
citizens are. Specifically, they are more trustful, altruistic, supportive of equality, 
tolerant, and humanitarian than other citizens are."). 
180. Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 413. 
181. Jd. at 427. 
182. Jd. 
183. ld. 
184. ld. at 427, app. 1 at 435. 
185. Id. at 419-20; accord Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and 
Reality, 22 1. MGMT. 507, 511 (1996) (connecting PSM and morality as personal 
variables directly related to whistleblowing). 
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unethical activity, the whistleblowers demonstrated higher rates of 
performance, achievement, job satisfaction, and job comrnitment. 186 
In addition, whistleblowers were not motivated by monetary rewards 
to report unethical activity; instead, whistleblowers most valued job 
security and the public interest. 187 These distinctions led Professors 
Brewer and Selden to conclude that the act of whistleblowing was 
positively correlated with PSM.188 Their survey confirmed the 1992 
Merit Principles Survey's finding that half of all federal employees 
who witness illegal or wasteful activity report it, and it also provided 
further support of the widespread existence of PSM-related attitudes 
and behaviors among the public workforce. 189 
The PSM Theory has been met with criticism. Under the rational-
choice theory, critics counter the altruistic and civic-minded portrayal 
of public employees by arguing that their higher rates of political 
participation suggest self-interest. 190 Because public employees rely 
on the government for their livelihood, it is in their best interests to 
be involved in politics and more beneficial to vote than those in the 
private sector. 191 
However, the rational-choice theory does not account for the higher 
rates of civic participation and self-sacrifice found within public 
employee populations. Because they are motivated by altruistic, 
civic-minded goals, public employees perform one-third more civic 
activities than other citizens. l92 Professors Brewer and Selden 
demonstrated that whistleblowers are not motivated by personal 
186. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 431-33, exhibit 5. 
Our findings reveal that federal whistle blowers act in ways that 
are consistent with the theory of PSM. That is, they are motivated 
by concern for the public interest, they are high performers, and 
they report high levels of achievement, job commitment, and job 
satisfaction. Moreover, federal whistle blowers are likely to work 
in high performing work groups and organizations. 
Id. at413. 
187. Seeid. at429-31,exhibit4. 
188. Seeid.at413,431-33. 
189. Id. at 433-34 ("[W]histle blowers are productive, valued, and committed members of 
their organizations. This study extends these findings beyond a small, heroic set of 
whistle blowers to a larger group offederal employees."). 
190. See Brewer, supra note 166, at 17. 
19l. Id. (citing James C. Garand, et aI., Bureaucrats, Policy Attitudes, and Political 
Behavior: Extension of the Bureau Voting Model of Government Growth, 1 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 177 (1991)). 
192. See id. at 16. 
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rewards but are willing to speak out to reduce waste and fraud at the 
expense of their own livelihood. 193 
Even with this opposing criticism, the PSM Theory continues to 
thrive in academia and social-science communities. Because the 
PSM Theory shows that office performance is tied to the pro social 
behaviors of its employees,194 Professors Brewer and Selden 
concluded that "public managers and scholars should utilize this 
knowledge in ways that make the public service a more efficient and 
effective delivery system for democratic government.,,195 Among the 
theory's many suggestions for public administration is to further 
organization initiatives by capitalizing on PSM characteristics rather 
than self-interest l96 and reforming public-employee whistleblower 
protection. 197 
B. The Government Employer's Use of Citizenship to Motivate 
Public Employees 
1. Recruitment 
Government employment has often been referred to as a calling or 
fulfillment of civic duty that strikes a chord with particular 
individuals. 198 A strong sense of citizenship has always been a part of 
the federal government's recruitment of public employees. In 
Garcetti, Justice Souter highlighted the Food and Drug 
Administration's advertisement of public employment as a way to 
"'give back to [their] community, state and country by making a 
difference in the lives of Americans everywhere. ",199 The 
Department of Homeland Security has linked patriotism and civic 
duty with border-patrol positions when recruiting in areas of the 
country where people are not otherwise familiar with the work. 200 
According to the Office of Personnel Management, thousands 
answered this call of civic duty in response to the terrorist attacks of 
193. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 420,429,434. 
194. See Brewer, supra note 166, at 7. 
195. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 434. 
196. See Brewer, supra note 166, at 20. 
197. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 433-34. 
198. Houston, supra note 171, at 68. 
199. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 433 n.4 (Souter, 1., dissenting); see also text 
accompanying notes 89-90. 
200. See Adam Jadhav, Border Patrol Recruits Here, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 5, 
2008, at B1. 
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September 11,2001,201 and subsequently, the federal government has 
not struggled in employment recruitment. 202 Therefore, it is of no 
surprise that the federal government benefits from the perception of 
strong citizenship in public employment. 
2. Whistleblower Speech 
Beyond recruitment, civic duty has been tied to the public 
employee's speech and duty to report waste, fraud, and abuse in their 
government agencies. 203 Because public employees are the best 
source for reporting government breaches of public trust,204 the 
Department of Justice recognizes that a whistleblower "who speaks 
out about waste, fraud or abuse performs a public service. Such acts 
of courage and patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often 
save taxpayer dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled.,,205 
Just as President Obama calls public employees outstanding 
Americans, research and practice demonstrate that citizenship is tied 
to the government's recruitment of public employees, its 
encouragement of whistleblower speech as a necessary part of 
accountability and efficiency, and the individual employees' 
motivation to work in public service. 206 
201. Hon. Dan G. Blair, Acting Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Driving Change-
Driving Results (March 10, 2005), available at http://www.opm.gov/speeches/2005/ 
DGB-MarlO.asp ("The good news, though, is that people want to work for the Federal 
government. There is no difficulty in attracting candidates to join the Federal Team. 
Let me say that again-attracting people is not the issue. Tens of thousands of 
Americans answered the call of public service after 9/11 - and the interest 
continues."). 
202. Id. 
203. Dawn R. Franklin, The Outsiders: Broadening the Scope o/Standing in Whistleblower 
Actions in Light 0/ Anderson v. United States Department of Labor, 20 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 281, 289-90 (2006) ("[B]oth employees and non-employees 
have the same civic duty to 'blow the whistle' on employers .... "). 
204. S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 0/2009: Hearing on S. 372, 
supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Rajesh De, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of 
Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice) ("The administration recognizes that the 
best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse is often a government 
employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak out."). 
205. Id. 
206. See Brewer, et aI., supra note 172, at 259-60 ('''As an official you are accountable to 
the public you serve . . . . I love my country . . . . I will do anything to keep the 
freedom we have so duty, honor and country raise my emotions. '''); President Barack 
Obama, Detroit Incident, supra note 4. 
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V. CORRECTING THE BALANCE BY RETURNING TO 
PICKERING 
[Vol. 40 
In law as well as in research, pUblic-employee speech provides 
societal value because "[a]s civically active citizens, public 
employees are in a prime position. .. to initiate a dialogue on 
community issues"z07 based on their "informed and definite opinions 
as to how [public] funds. .. should be spent.,,208 In light of the PSM 
Theory, it is clear that Garcetti's separation of public employment 
and citizenship ignores civic participation and social trust as integral 
characteristics to efficient public servants and the correlation between 
these characteristics and whistleblower speech. 209 To preserve the 
societal benefit of employee speech, citizenship should remain at the 
heart of defining constitutional speech protection. Justice Souter's 
argument in his dissent (that the roles of citizen and public employee 
are not mutually exclusive and that the government benefits from 
incorporating civic duty into public employmenelO) parallels social 
science research findings that public service motivation is a 
behavioral concept, defined by the individual's citizenship initiative 
rather than his employment status. 211 With elevated rates of civic 
participation and job dedication, whistleblowers cannot sever their 
roles of citizen and employee without discounting these PSM 
characteristics and inhibiting their related contributions to office 
efficiency. Whistleblowers are catalysts for government efficiency 
because they stop government corruption through informing the 
electorate who can react to the whistleblower's report, vote to end 
unwanted waste, and legally pursue those accountable for it. Z12 In 
short, Garcetti permits retaliation for the very speech that would 
otherwise further government efficiency and mischaracterizes the 
First Amendment balance as one of parties rather than of societal 
interests. 213 
Professors Brewer and Selden suggest that whistleblower 
protection statutes are not the proper solution for the inequity of 
Garcetti. 214 In the past fifteen years, the increase in legislative 
207. Houston, supra note 171, at 82. 
208. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968). 
209. See supra notes 166-79 and accompanying text. 
210. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 432-33 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
211. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 416. 
212. See id. at 434. 
213. See supra notes 130-34, 144-149 and accompanying text. 
214. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 434 (suggesting that, rather than enacting 
statutes, governments should increase efforts to study and utilize the link between 
PSM Theory and the public service ethic). 
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protection has proven correlated with the rise in retaliation against 
whistleblowers and thus has not alleviated the job-security concerns 
of those public employees with high PSM levels and a strong 
likelihood to speak out against unethical activity. 215 At the same 
time, legislatures continue to dispute amendments to the 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 without resolve216 at the 
expense of whistleblowers. 217 
To address Garcetti's inequity and the unresolved problems of 
statutory protections, the Connick-Pickering analysis should be 
reinstated because it implicitly adopts the reasoning of the PSM 
Theory. In highlighting the societal value of the public employee 
who is in the best position to address the problems of the government 
employer,218 Pickering and its progeny introduced the public 
employee as a valued individual and contributor to both his 
government employer as well as the greater community. 219 It is no 
coincidence that the PSM Theory proposes that public employees, 
particularly whistleblowers with high PSM levels, are the best suited, 
in behavior as much as in position, to pursue the government's 
interests of office morale and efficiency.220 The Pickering balancing 
test echoes the PSM Theory that whistleblowers can enhance 
government interests, and that those public employees should not 
ordinarily be adversely treated on the basis of speech prior to a 
demonstrated harm to office efficiency. 221 
215. Id. 
216. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. 
217. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 154, at 1546 (stating that the lack of whistleblower 
protection jeopardizes "the next government employee in the wrong place at the 
wrong time"). 
218. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 
391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968»; see also S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 372, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Rajesh 
De, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice). 
219. See generally City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (noting that "The 
community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues" if 
public employees were unable to speak on matters regarding operations of their 
employers.); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (recognizing the 
importance of harmony among coworkers "for which personal loyalty and confidence 
are necessary"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (noting that emphasis 
upon public employees' rights as citizens "reflects both ... historical involvement ... 
and ... common sense"). 
220. See Brewer, supra note 166, at 6, 20 (concluding that public employees are more 
civic-minded than other citizens, a trait related to effective self-government and 
conducive to economic development). 
22l. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 433-34. 
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A return to the Connick-Pickering analysis would allow for 
consideration of the speech's benefits to both the individual and the 
government employer as well as reunite citizenship with public-
employee speech.222 For the individual with PSM characteristics 
such as job dedication and civic participation, protecting employee 
speech would promote both the societal benefit of his or her informed 
participation in the improvement of government agencies as well as 
the internal benefits of self-determination and autonomy. 223 For the 
government employer, the Connick-Pickering analysis considers the 
efficiency benefits of some employee speech but also provides 
justifiable limitations, such as the Connick public concern 
requirement and the ability to control speech where its harm 
outweighs that of speech suppression. 224 For society in general, a 
case-by-case balancing approach more readily responds to the 
changing challenges of our government and the ability of dedicated 
public employees to recognize these challenges and redress them 
with solutions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment has never been absolute, but neither has the 
government's control over the public employee.225 Whistleblowing 
and .public-employee speech on matters of public concern further 
both the individual's autonomy and the government's interest in 
efficiency.226 Garcetti's separation of employee speech from 
citizenship and its societal benefit ignores the overwhelming 
evidence that "[ t ]his is freedom of speech when it counts.,,227 
The PSM Theory demonstrates that whistleblowers are generally 
the type of employees that the government employer would like to 
have: altruistic, efficient, and dedicated to public service. 228 These 
desirable characteristics and past whistleblowers like Robert 
MacLean suggest that Garcetti should be reviewed and a return to the 
222. See supra Part IV.B. 
223. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (discussing self-fulfillment or '''affirmation of self" as a principal 
function of the First Amendment (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966)). 
224. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142-46, 147-48, 154; supra Part II.A; supra text 
accompanying notes 143-47. 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 37,135-39. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69, 220. 
227. S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 372, 
supra note 14, at 60 (statement of Thomas Devine, Legal Dir., Gov't Accountability 
Project). 
228. See Brewer & Selden, supra note 169, at 433-34; see also supra note 179. 
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previous balance of the Connick-Pickering analysis should be 
implemented to cultivate beneficial public-employee speech. 229 
As public-employee unions join together in the Make It Safe 
Coalition to petition for greater whistleblower protection230 and states 
review their own constitutional law in light of Garcetti,231 they should 
consider the Public Service Motivation Theory in defining 
whistleblower protection and encourage employee speech as a benefit 
to society, government efficiency, and the individual's fulfillment of 
civic duty. 
Diane Norcross t 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 142-49, 161-64. 
230. See S. 372-The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 
372, supra note 14, at 19-21 (statement of Thomas Devine, Legal Dir., Gov't 
Accountability Project). 
231. J. Michael McGuinness, Developments in Public Employee First Amendment and 
Equal Protection Law, GEO. U. L. CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Apr. 17-18, 
2008, at 1, 4, available at 2008 WL 2500678 ("In light of Garcetti[,] ... plaintiffs 
must explore state constitutional claims as an alternative . . .. [T]here is often very 
little applicable case law. There is often room for development of the law."). 
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